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CIVIL RIGHTS
SCOTUS Denies Review in Gay Rights Case
Whether Title VII covers sexual orientation unlikely to be aired in 2017-18 term
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD
T he US Supreme Court announced on Decem-ber 11 that it will not review a decision by a 
three-judge panel of the Atlanta-
based 11th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which ruled on March 10 
that a lesbian formerly employed 
as a security guard at a Georgia 
hospital could not sue for sexual 
orientation discrimination under 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.
The full 11th Circuit denied a 
motion to reconsider the case on 
July 10, and Lambda Legal, rep-
resenting plaintiff Jameka Evans, 
fi led a petition with the Supreme 
Court seeking review on Septem-
ber 7.
At the heart of Lambda’s peti-
tion was an urgent request to the 
Court to resolve a split among the 
lower federal courts and within the 
federal government itself on the 
question whether Title VII, which 
bans employment discrimination 
because of sex by employers that 
have at least 15 employees, can be 
interpreted to ban discrimination 
because of sexual orientation.
The impact on Evans herself of 
the court’s refusal to take up her 
case may not be decisive since she 
remains free to pursue her dis-
crimination case on a different le-
gal theory, but for now at least the 
high court is standing back from 
deciding a key issue regarding LG-
BTQ rights.
Nobody can deny that members 
of Congress voting in 1964 were 
not thinking about banning sex-
ual orientation discrimination at 
that time, but their adoption of a 
general ban on sex discrimination 
in employment has been developed 
by the courts over more than half 
a century to encompass a wide 
range of discriminatory conduct 
reaching far beyond the simple 
proposition that employers cannot 
discriminate against an individual 
because she is a woman or he is a 
man.
Early in the history of Title VII, 
the Supreme Court ruled that em-
ployers could not treat people dif-
ferently because of generalizations 
about men and women, and by the 
late 1970s had accepted the propo-
sition that workplace harassment 
of women was a form of sex dis-
crimination.
In a key ruling in 1989, the high 
court held that discrimination 
against a woman because the em-
ployer considered her inadequately 
feminine in her appearance or be-
havior was a form of sex discrimi-
nation, under what is known as 
the sex stereotyping theory, and 
during the 1990s the Court ruled 
that a victim of workplace same-
sex harassment could sue under 
Title VII, overruling a lower court 
decision that a man could sue for 
harassment only if he was being 
harassed by a woman, not by other 
men.
In that latter decision for a 
unanimous court, Justice Antonin 
Scalia opined that Title VII was not 
restricted to the “evils” identifi ed 
by Congress in 1964, but could 
extend to “reasonably comparable 
evils” to effectuate the legislative 
purpose of achieving a non-dis-
criminatory workplace.
By the early years of this centu-
ry, lower federal courts had begun 
to accept the argument that the 
sex stereotyping theory provided a 
basis to overrule earlier decisions 
that transgender people were not 
protected from discrimination un-
der Title VII. There is an emerging 
consensus among the lower federal 
courts, bolstered by rulings of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) as early as 
2012, that gender identity discrim-
ination is clearly discrimination 
because of sex, and the 11th Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals several years 
ago embraced that view in a case 
involving a transgender woman 
fi red from a research position at 
the Georgia legislature.
However, the idea that some 
variant of the sex stereotyping 
theory could also expand Title VII 
to protect lesbian, gay, or bisexual 
employees took longer to emerge. It 
was not until 2015 that the EEOC 
issued a decision concluding that 
sexual orientation discrimination 
is a form of sex discrimination, in 
part responding to the sex stereo-
typing decisions in the lower fed-
eral courts. And it was not until 
April 4 of this year that a federal 
appeals court, the Chicago-based 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
approved that theory in a strongly 
worded opinion by a decisive ma-
jority of the entire 11-judge circuit 
bench, just a few weeks after the 
11th Circuit panel ruling in the 
Jameka Evans case.
Writing for the Seventh Circuit, 
Judge Diane Wood said, “It would 
require considerable calisthenics 
to remove the ‘sex’ from ‘sexual 
orientation.’”
The 11th Circuit panel’s 2-1 
decision to reject Jameka Evans’ 
sexual orientation discrimination 
claim seemed a distinct setback in 
light of these developments.
However, consistent with the 
11th Circuit’s prior gender identity 
discrimination ruling, one of the 
judges in the majority and the dis-
senting judge agreed that Evans’ 
Title VII claim could be revived 
using the sex stereotyping theory 
based on how she dressed and be-
haved, and sent the case back to 
the lower court on that basis. The 
dissenting judge would have gone 
further and allowed Evans’ sexual 
orientation discrimination claim to 
proceed under Title VII. The other 
judge in the majority strained to 
distinguish this case from the cir-
cuit’s prior sex stereotyping ruling, 
and would have dismissed the case 
outright.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
April opened up a split among the 
circuit courts in light of a string 
of rulings by several different cir-
cuit courts over the past several 
decades rejecting sexual orienta-
tion discrimination claims by gay 
litigants, although several of those 
circuits have since embraced the 
sex stereotyping theory to allow 
gay litigants to bring sex discrimi-
nation claims under Title VII if they 
could plausibly allege they suffered 
discrimination because of gender 
nonconforming dress or conduct.
Other courts took the position 
that as long as the plaintiff’s sex-
ual orientation appeared to be the 
main reason why they suffered dis-
crimination, they could not bring a 
Title VII claim.
In recent years, several federal 
trial judges have approved an al-
ternative argument: that same-sex 
attraction is itself a departure from 
widely-held stereotypes of what it 
means to be a man or a woman, 
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and thus that discrimination mo-
tivated by the victim’s same-sex 
attraction is necessarily a form of 
sex discrimination under Title VII. 
Within the New York-based Second 
Circuit, several trial judges have 
recently embraced this view, but 
three-judge circuit panels consis-
tently rejected it.
Some progress was made this 
past spring, however, when a three-
judge panel in Christiansen v. Om-
nicom Group overruled a trial judge 
to fi nd that a plaintiff whose sexu-
al orientation was clearly a motiva-
tion for his discharge could bring 
a sex stereotyping Title VII claim 
when he could plausibly allege be-
havioral nonconformity apart from 
his same-sex attraction.
More recently, the Second Cir-
cuit agreed to grant en banc recon-
sideration by the full circuit bench 
on the underlying question and 
heard oral argument in September 
in Zarda v. Altitude Express about 
whether sexual orientation dis-
crimination, as such, is outlawed 
by Title VII.
Zarda involves a gay male plain-
tiff whose attempt to rely alterna-
tively on a sex stereotyping claim 
had been rejected by the trial 
judge in line with Second Circuit 
precedent. Plaintiff Donald Zarda 
died while the case was pend-
ing, but it is being carried on by 
his estate. Observers at the oral 
argument thought that a major-
ity of the judges of the full circuit 
bench were likely to follow the lead 
of the Seventh Circuit and expand 
the coverage of Title VII in this 
circuit, which covers Connecticut 
and Vermont as well as New York. 
Argument was held more than two 
months ago, so a decision could be 
imminent.
Much of the media comment 
about the Zarda case, as well as the 
questioning by the judges, focused 
on the spectacle of the federal gov-
ernment opposing itself in court. 
The EEOC fi led an amicus brief in 
support of the Zarda Estate and 
sent an attorney to argue in favor 
of Title VII coverage. The Justice 
Department fi led a brief in support 
of the employer and sent an attor-
ney to argue that the three-judge 
panel had correctly rejected the 
plaintiff’s Title VII claim. The poli-
tics of the situation was obvious: 
The Trump appointees now run-
ning the Justice Department had 
changed DOJ’s position (over the 
reported protest of career profes-
sionals there), while the holdover 
Obama majority at the EEOC was 
standing fi rm by the decision that 
agency made in 2015. As Trump’s 
appointment of new commission-
ers changes the EEOC’s political 
complexion, this internal split is 
likely to be resolved against Title 
VII protection for LGBTQ people.
This is clearly a hot controversy 
on a question with national import, 
so why did the Supreme Court re-
fuse to hear the case? The court 
does not customarily announce its 
reasons for denying review — and 
did not do so this time. None of the 
justices dissented from the denial 
of review, either.
A refusal to review a case is not 
a decision on the merits and does 
not mean the court approves the 
11th Circuit Court of Appeals’ de-
cision. It is merely a determina-
tion by the court, which exercises 
tight control over its docket, not 
to review the case. Hypothesizing 
a rationale, it’s worth noting that 
plaintiff Evans has not suffered a 
fi nal dismissal of her case, having 
been allowed by the 11th Circuit to 
fi le an amended complaint focus-
ing on sex stereotyping instead of 
sexual orientation discrimination, 
so she can still have her day in 
court. In the context of her claim, 
then, there is no pressing need 
for the court to resolve the circuit 
split.
It may also be signifi cant that 
Georgia Regional Hospital, whom 
Evans is suing, did not even ap-
pear before the 11th Circuit to ar-
gue its side of the case and initially 
did not fi le papers opposing Lamb-
da Legal’s petition. The Supreme 
Court Clerk’s Offi ce distributed the 
Lambda petition and some amicus 
briefs supporting it to the justices 
in anticipation of a conference they 
were to hold on October 27. The 
hospital’s lack of a response evi-
dently sparked concern from some 
of the justices, who directed the 
clerk to ask it to fi le a response, 
which was fi led by Georgia’s attor-
ney general on behalf of the public 
hospital on November 9. The case 
was then put on the agenda for the 
court’s December 8 conference, 
at which the decision was made 
to deny review. The state’s fi ling 
argued, among other things, that 
the hospital had not been properly 
served with the complaint that ini-
tiated the lawsuit. Those kinds of 
procedural issues sometimes deter 
the court from taking up a case.
Whatever its reasoning, the 
court has put off deciding this is-
sue, most likely for the remainder 
of the current term. The last argu-
ment day on the Court’s calendar 
is April 25, and the last day for 
announcing decisions is June 25. 
Even if the Second Circuit prompt-
ly issues a decision in the Zarda 
case, the losing party would have 
a few months to fi le a petition for 
Supreme Court review, followed by 
a month for the winner to fi le its 
response. Even if the court then 
grants review in that case, the fi l-
ing of briefs on the merits and am-
icus briefs would likely force the 
case too late into the current term 
to be argued in front of the court 
before next year’s term that begins 
in October 2018.
Unfortunately, that raises the 
question of who will be on the 
court at the time this issue makes 
it there. Rumors of retirements are 
rife, and they center on the oldest 
justices, pro-LGBTQ Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg as well as conservative 
but generally pro-gay Anthony 
Kennedy, who wrote the major-
ity opinions in the four major gay 
rights wins the high court has 
decided since 1996. If President 
Donald Trump gets to nominate 
successors to either of them, the 
court’s receptivity to gay rights ar-
guments is likely to be adversely 
affected as the example of Justice 
Neil Gorsuch has already made 
abundantly clear.
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procedural due process, and free-
dom of speech. Judge Pechman 
found that three out of these four 
theories were suffi ciently sup-
ported by the complaint to deny 
the Justice Department’s motion 
to dismiss the case, although she 
granted the motion regarding the 
procedural due process claim.
As had two district judges before 
her — including, as well, on No-
vember 21, Judge Marvin J. Garbis 
of the Maryland District Court — 
Pechman cut and pasted screen 
captures of the president’s July 26 
tweet announcing the policy into 
her opinion, and used particularly 
cutting language to reject DOJ’s ar-
gument that the president’s policy 
decision was entitled to the kind of 
judicial deference usually accorded 
to military policy decisions.
Addressing the DOJ’s reliance 
on a 1981 Supreme Court ruling 
on whether the military can limit 
draft registration to men only, 
Pechman noted that its ruling 
there relied on “extensive review of 
legislative testimony, fl oor debates, 
and committee reports,” and held 
“that Congress was entitled to 
deference when, in ‘exercising the 
congressional authority to raise 
and support armies and make 
rules for their governance,’ it does 
not act ‘unthinkingly’ or ‘refl exive-
ly and not for any considered rea-
son.’” In contrast, the judge found, 
“the prohibition on military service 
by transgender individuals was 
announced by President Trump 
on Twitter, abruptly and without 
any evidence of considered reason 
or deliberation.” The deference ac-
corded to the military’s draft reg-
istration policy, therefore, does not 
apply to the president’s policy.
Pechman found that the plain-
tiffs satisfi ed all the requirements 
for winning a preliminary injunc-
tion against the Trump transgender 
ban, and she barred the government 
“from taking any action relative to 
transgender individuals that is in-
consistent with the status quo that 
existed prior to President Trump’s 
July 26, 2017 announcement.”
Pechman’s injunction, then, 
joins those by Kollar-Kotelly and 
Garbis. All three preliminary in-
junctions block the discharge of 
transgender service members 
while the case is pending and re-
quire the Pentagon to allow trans-
gender people to begin enlisting 
on January 1. The injunctions by 
Garbis and Pechman also block 
the administration from refusing 
to fund transition-related health 
care, including surgery. In the face 
of this united front from the three 
judges, it seems likely that Judge 
Bernal in California will eventu-
ally issue a similar order.
Attention now turns to the courts 
of appeals that oversee these four 
district judges, where the DOJ is 
likely to continue fi ling appeals.
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